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Abstract 
Representative online customer reviews are critical to the effective functioning of the Internet 
economy. In this study, I investigate the representativeness of online review distributions to examine 
how extremity bias and conformity impact it, and explore whether online review solicitations alter 
representativeness. Past research on extreme distribution of online ratings commonly relied solely on 
observed public online ratings. One strength of the current paper is that I observe the private 
satisfaction ratings of customers regardless of whether they choose to write an online review or not. I 
show that both extremity bias and conformity exist in unsolicited online word-of-mouth (WOM) and 
introduce online review solicitations as a mechanism that can partially de-bias ratings. Solicitations 
increase all customers’ engagement in online WOM, but if solicited, those with moderate experiences 
increase their engagement more than those with extreme experiences. Consequently, while extremity 
bias still exists in solicited online WOM, solicitations significantly increase the representativeness of 
rating distributions. Surprisingly, the results demonstrate that without conformity, unsolicited online 
WOM would be even less representative of the original customer experiences. Further, I document 
that both solicited and unsolicited reviews equally overstate the average customer experience 
(compared to average private ratings) despite stark differences in their rating distributions. Finally, I 
establish that solicitations for reviews on the company-owned website, on average, decrease the 
number of one-star reviews on a third-party review platform. 
 
Keywords: review solicitation; reporting biases; representative reviews; extremity bias; social 
influence; conformity; online reviews; online word-of-mouth; third-party review platforms; 
TripAdvisor 
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1. Introduction 
When choosing goods and services, customers increasingly look to online word-of-mouth (WOM) to 
provide accurate information about product quality. Previous research has shown that the impact of 
one-star reviews on sales is greater than five-star reviews, suggesting that customers pay attention to 
the distribution of online reviews rather than merely relying on summary statistics (Chevalier and 
Mayzlin 2006). However, given the voluntary nature of online WOM, it is not clear whether the 
distribution of online reviews is actually representative of the underlying experiences of customers.  
It is widely speculated that online reviews are subject to many reporting biases (Berger 2014; 
Luca 2016). One type of bias – what I refer to as extremity bias – reflects the notion that the set of 
customers who write online reviews is not representative of the underlying customer population. 
Researchers assume that customers at the extreme ends of the satisfaction spectrum engage in greater 
online WOM (Hu, Pavlou, and Zhang 2017; Li and Hitt 2008). Another type of bias – what I call 
conformity – captures the idea that the satisfaction ratings reviewers report could depend in part on 
their exposure to preexisting online reviews, specifically to the average rating (which tends to be 
displayed prominently on review websites). This suggests that customers who write online reviews 
make systematic mistakes and provide an inaccurate measurement of their actual experience by 
misreporting their satisfaction in order to conform to the average of previous ratings. 
Both types of bias call into question the degree to which online WOM represents underlying 
customer experiences. These sorts of biases matter because they can influence not just which products 
are bought but even which products are made. For instance, if an asymmetric extremity bias exists, 
then an unrepresentative high share of bad ratings could harm high-quality products by discouraging 
future purchases, even though a representative set of reviews would endorse the product. As a result, 
the extremity bias could reduce the premium on quality and disincentivize companies from producing 
high-quality goods. 
In this study, I focus on the representativeness of online review distributions to examine how 
extremity bias and conformity impact it, and explore whether online review solicitations alter 
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representativeness. In doing so, I answer the call by Askalidis, Kim, and Malthouse (2017) and 
Schoenmueller, Netzer, and Stahl (2019) for research into whether unsolicited or solicited reviews 
provide a more representative set of reviews. Review solicitations have the potential to change the 
representativeness of online review distributions through extremity bias and conformity. Previous 
research has documented that review solicitations are very effective in stimulating online review 
creation (Burtch et al. 2017; Klein et al. 2018). If review solicitations successfully motivate 
underrepresented customers to engage in online WOM, then companies could solicit reviews to 
reduce extremity bias. Review solicitations could also provide companies a unique opportunity to 
manipulate conformity. For instance, companies can “enable” (“disable”) conformity by (not) 
displaying previously written online reviews to potential reviewers throughout the review solicitation 
procedure.  
In addition to gathering a more representative set of reviews, companies could also use 
solicitations to impact WOM in a variety of ways. For instance, customers who would ordinarily leave 
an online review on a third-party website might be induced (if solicited by the company) to leave a 
review on the company website instead – in effect shifting online reviews from one website to 
another. Companies could be interested in pursuing this strategy if it resulted in moving negative 
online WOM away from third-party review platforms (that potentially have a greater reach than the 
company website) since customers typically use these websites for product comparison. Currently, it 
is not well understood how review solicitations for a company website affect review writing behavior 
in terms of reporting biases, nor how they affect review writing on third-party review aggregation 
websites. Nevertheless, companies have begun to implement online review solicitations for their own 
websites. Thus, a closer look at the impact of review solicitation is both timely and warranted. 
Accordingly, I address three research questions: 
1. Does extremity bias or conformity occur in online reviews, and if so, how do they impact 
representativeness? 
2. Which set of reviews – solicited or unsolicited – is most representative of customer 
experiences? 
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3. Do review solicitations for a company website affect reviews on third-party aggregation 
websites? 
To answer these questions, I generated a unique data set from a multi-chain hotel group that 
conducts customer satisfaction surveys and hosts online reviews on its own website. Four features of 
the current setup made it ideal to test my questions. First, even if customers did not write an online 
review, I was able to observe their private satisfaction ratings. These private ratings allowed me to (1) 
explore which customers were more likely to engage in solicited or unsolicited online WOM (i.e., 
extremity bias), (2) investigate how reviewers changed their private ratings when posting their public 
online ratings (i.e., conformity), and (3) construct a baseline rating distribution of the entire customer 
base against which public online rating distributions (of either solicited or unsolicited reviews) are 
compared in order to evaluate representativeness of both solicited and unsolicited reviews. The 
resulting analyses build on and extend previous studies that relied solely on observed public online 
ratings (see Hu, Pavlou, and Zhang 2017; Li and Hitt 2008; Moe and Schweidel 2012).  
Second, the hotel group randomly solicited a fraction of satisfaction survey takers to write online 
reviews. This random intervention allowed me to establish the causal effect of online review 
solicitations. Reporting has shown that other potential data sets (such as from TripAdvisor’s Review 
Express service) are less than ideal, as solicitations are not random but instead are contaminated by 
the fraudulent activity by hotels selectively prompting only the customers they believe will give 
positive feedback (Guardian 2018).  
A third feature of the data set that made it ideal for my purposes was that I could distinguish 
between two distinct groups of reviewers: those who were exposed to preexisting online ratings while 
writing an online review on the hotel’s website, and those who did not see such information 
throughout the review solicitation procedure. Behavioral differences between these two groups of 
reviewers allowed me to test the existence of conformity in online reviews.  
Finally, the hotel group initially implemented review solicitations for a random subset of its hotels 
before rolling out solicitations to all hotels within its portfolio. This allowed me to construct treatment 
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and control groups to examine the impact on reviewing behavior at TripAdvisor.com of online review 
solicitations for the hotel company’s website. 
The results show that while both solicited and unsolicited customers exhibit extremity bias, two 
distinctions emerge within extremity bias between solicited and unsolicited reporting: (1) extremity 
bias is asymmetric for unsolicited customers, with extremely dissatisfied customers engaging in 
greater unsolicited online WOM than extremely satisfied ones, and (2) extremity bias overall (i.e., in 
both directions) is weaker for solicited customers. The findings also reveal that even though 
solicitations significantly increase the propensity of all customers to write an online review, the exact 
magnitude of this solicitation effect depends on their private satisfaction rating. Solicitations increase 
online WOM participation of customers with moderate experiences more than those with extreme 
experiences, thereby attenuating extremity bias and increasing the representativeness of online WOM. 
Furthermore, I document the existence of conformity. Surprisingly, despite being typically viewed as 
a bias, conformity counteracts extremity bias and results in greater representativeness in the rating 
distributions of reviewers who are exposed to the preexisting online reviews during review creation. 
Finally, I provide evidence that review solicitations for the company website significantly shift 
extremely negative (i.e., one-star) reviews from third-party platforms to the company website. 
Although I initially evaluate the representativeness of the online rating distributions, I recognize 
that customer purchasing decisions are also driven by online review valence, typically measured by 
the average online rating, and to a certain extent, by the online review variance (Babić Rosario et al. 
2016). Even if extremity bias exists, a disproportionately high share of extremely satisfactory and 
extremely unsatisfactory experiences in unsolicited online WOM could cancel each other out, leaving 
the average online rating unbiased. The same property applies to solicited online WOM. I show that 
posted online reviews equally overstate average ratings (compared to average private ratings) 
regardless of whether they are solicited or unsolicited. This is particularly interesting because I 
document considerable differences between the online rating distributions of solicited and unsolicited 
reviews. Remarkably, the distributional differences between them do not translate into differences in 
average product ratings. However, the variance between the rating distributions of solicited and 
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unsolicited reviews does change: the variance of online reviews would be lower if all customers were 
solicited as opposed to unsolicited.  
This study contributes to the literature on online reviews in several ways. First, whereas past work 
on unsolicited online WOM could only presume its existence, this study documents the presence of 
extremity bias in both solicited and unsolicited online WOM using observed data on customer 
satisfaction and online WOM engagement. Second, I provide evidence to support the hypothesis that 
customers adjust their private ratings to conform to the preexisting average online rating as they post 
them publicly on the review website. This conformity effect increases the representativeness of 
unsolicited online WOM. Third, the study deepens our understanding of the representativeness of 
unsolicited online WOM and the underlying mechanism through which representativeness is altered 
by online review solicitations. Fourth, to the best of my knowledge, this is the first study to document 
online WOM spillover effects across different review websites. This is important because the finding 
suggests that stimulating online reviews posted to a company website through review solicitations 
reduces the amount of negative online WOM at a review aggregator website, which potentially has a 
more extensive reach than the company website itself.  
I organize the remainder of the article as follows: First, I review the previous literature. Next, I 
provide a formal definition of the representativeness of online review distributions, extremity bias, 
and the solicitation effect. I then offer a detailed description of the data and describe the empirical 
analysis. Finally, I present my results and robustness checks, and conclude with a discussion of this 
study’s implications.   
2. Literature Review 
The current research builds on and extends the findings of previous research that studied reporting 
biases in online reviews. Previous research has shown that online reviews evolve systematically over 
time and sequence (Godes and Silva 2012; Li and Hitt 2008; Wu and Huberman 2008) and are 
impacted by platform interventions in which managers respond to online reviews posted (Chevalier, 
Dover, and Mayzlin 2018; Proserpio and Zervas 2017; Wang and Chaudhry 2018). Moreover, 
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Mayzlin, Dover, and Chevalier (2014) demonstrated that online reviews are biased not by customers 
but by companies themselves through the creation of promotional reviews.  
This work is most relevant to research investigating one of the most prominent features of online 
reviews: online reviews typically follow a J-shaped, or extreme, distribution of ratings, characterized 
by the tendency of extremely positive and extremely negative ratings to outnumber moderate ratings. 
Additionally, review ratings tend to heavily skew towards the highest possible rating, resulting in a 
rating distribution that resembles the shape of the letter “J”. Recently, Schoenmueller, Netzer, and 
Stahl (2019) used data from 25 online review platforms to document the high prevalence of extreme 
distribution in online reviews. However, the mere observation that rating distributions are extreme 
does not prove the existence of a reporting bias (e.g., extremity bias), because one plausible 
explanation for the extreme distribution is that the underlying distribution of experiences is itself 
extreme.  
Researchers have explained the presence of extreme distribution in online reviews by proposing 
multiple alternative mechanisms. While Brandes, Godes, and Mayzlin (2019) hypothesize an attrition-
based explanation (those with more extreme experiences have less probability of exiting the reviewer 
pool), the majority of previous work on the topic attributes extreme distributions to a utility-based 
mechanism (Hu, Pavlou, and Zhang 2017; Hu, Zhang, and Pavlou 2009; Schoenmueller, Netzer, and 
Stahl 2019). First introduced by Anderson (1998), this mechanism suggests that consumers receive 
greater utility from sharing extreme experiences. Using self-reported data on satisfaction and offline 
WOM activity, Anderson (1998) noted that the relationship between the two was U-shaped – 
customers at the extreme ends of the satisfaction spectrum engaged in greater offline WOM, 
indicating that extremity bias exists in offline WOM. Moreover, the extremity bias was asymmetric – 
extremely dissatisfied customers were more likely to engage in offline WOM than extremely satisfied 
ones. In line with Anderson (1998), I conjecture that customers with extreme experiences are more 
motivated to engage in unsolicited online WOM. Therefore, in this study I expect to find a U-shaped 
relationship between unsolicited online WOM and satisfaction. Further, because negative emotions 
are more motivating than positive ones, I expect to replicate the asymmetric extremity bias reported in 
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Anderson (1998) in the context of online WOM. The existence of such bias implies that online 
reviews from unsolicited customers may not be representative of the experiences of the underlying 
customer base. 
In order to accelerate the creation of online WOM, both online review platforms and companies 
are increasingly soliciting reviews. Consistent with the actions of companies, research has shown that 
review solicitations are very effective in stimulating online review creation (Burtch et al. 2017; Klein 
et al. 2018). For instance, the leading travel website company TripAdvisor (2018) reports that hotels 
using its review solicitation service, Review Express, achieve an average of 28% increase in the 
number of TripAdvisor reviews. In a recent study, Askalidis, Kim, and Malthouse (2017) 
demonstrated that unsolicited reviews are more negative than solicited reviews. Still, it is not a priori 
obvious whether certain customers would be more responsive to review solicitations. Solicitations 
provide an additional motivation to customers to participate in online WOM. For that reason, I expect 
solicitations to have the greatest impact in terms of increasing online WOM participation (compared 
to the baseline unsolicited WOM) on customers who lack the intrinsic motivation (e.g., moderate 
experiences) to post unsolicited reviews the most. Therefore, I suspect that solicitations will increase 
the engagement in online WOM by customers with moderate experiences compared to those with 
extreme experiences, and therefore attenuate extremity bias. However, it remains an empirical 
question whether extremity bias is completely eliminated in solicited online WOM.  
A second major source of potential bias in online WOM – the tendency of reviewers to modify 
the reporting of their experiences because of other reviews they have read – is a form of social 
influence I refer to as conformity. In their review article, Lerner and Tetlock (1999) report that 
individuals are inclined to conform especially when they must explain their opinions to an audience 
with known views. Because reviewers are expected to provide evidence that justifies their ratings, 
they may adjust their internal ratings based on seeing the average of existing online reviews while 
they are composing their own reviews. This results in conformity to the preexisting average online 
rating. Even though many social dynamics have been shown to exist in online reviews (Godes and 
Silva 2012; Li and Hitt 2008; Moe and Schweidel 2012; Moe and Trusov 2011; Muchnik, Aral, and 
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Taylor 2013; Sridhar and Srinivasan 2012), internal rating adjustments by reviewers as a result of 
conformity have not been documented (due mainly to data limitations).  
In order to establish the conformity effect, one must observe two ratings (the private internal 
rating of the reviewer and the eventual public online rating he posts). The current study attempts to 
provide evidence for conformity by comparing rating adjustment behaviors of two groups of 
reviewers: the first group had no exposure to the average of the preexisting online reviews before 
submitting their reviews, while the second group did. If conformity exists, the online reviews written 
by the second group should shift from the private rating toward the preexisting online average rating 
more than those written by the first group. Therefore, an important implication of the conformity 
effect is that it could potentially impact the representativeness of online review distributions.  
3. Representativeness of Online Rating Distributions 
In this section, I formally define the reporting bias in online ratings of unsolicited reviewers and 
discuss how it could be alleviated or exacerbated in online ratings of solicited reviewers. Additionally, 
I introduce a measure to evaluate the representativeness of online rating distributions. For clarity, in 
this section I assume away the possibility that customers can post an online rating that differs from 
their private rating (i.e., ignore the effects of conformity). Later in my empirical analysis, I relax this 
assumption.  
3.1. Reporting Bias in Unsolicited Online Ratings 
 Assume that there are 𝑁 customers who purchased a given product and each one has a private 
satisfaction rating, 𝑠, which they can publicly post as an online rating on the review website. Let’s 
denote the number of customers whose private ratings are 𝑠 with 𝑁𝑠, i.e., 𝑁 = ∑ 𝑁𝑠𝑠 , and their 
original proportion in the entire customer population with 𝛼𝑠 = 𝑁𝑠/𝑁. Then the proportion of 
reviewers with an online rating of 𝑠 on the online review website is 
 𝛼𝑠
𝑢𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑙 =
𝑁𝑅𝑠
𝑁𝑅
=
𝑁𝑠 ∗ 𝑝𝑠
𝑁 ∗ 𝑝𝑎𝑣𝑔
= 𝛼𝑠 ∗
𝑝𝑠
𝑝𝑎𝑣𝑔
, (1) 
where 𝑁𝑅𝑠 is the number of unsolicited online reviews posted with an online rating of 𝑠, 𝑁𝑅 is the 
total number of online ratings posted, 𝑝𝑠 is the probability that a customer with a private rating of 𝑠 
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posts an unsolicited online rating (i.e., 𝑁𝑅𝑠/𝑁𝑠), and 𝑝𝑎𝑣𝑔 is the average posting probability in the 
original customer population (i.e., 
𝑁𝑅
𝑁
= ∑ 𝛼𝑠 ∗ 𝑝𝑠𝑠 ). The final online representation of customers 
whose private ratings are 𝑠 is a function of three factors: (1) their original representation in the 
underlying customer population, 𝛼𝑠, (2) the probability that they post an unsolicited online rating, 𝑝𝑠, 
and (3) the average probability that a given customer in the original population posts an unsolicited 
online rating, 𝑝𝑎𝑣𝑔.  
 I define the reporting bias in unsolicited online ratings as  
𝛼𝑠
𝑢𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑙
𝛼𝑠
= 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐵𝑖𝑎𝑠𝑠
𝑢𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑙 =
𝑝𝑠
𝑝𝑎𝑣𝑔
. (2) 
If 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐵𝑖𝑎𝑠𝑠
𝑢𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑙 > 1, then customers with a rating of 𝑠 will be overrepresented (i.e., 𝛼𝑠
𝑢𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑙 >
𝛼𝑠) on the online review website, and if 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐵𝑖𝑎𝑠𝑠
𝑢𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑙 < 1, then they will be 
underrepresented. Simply put, any group will be underrepresented (overrepresented) if its members 
are less (more) likely to post an online rating than an average customer in the original customer 
population. I formally define extremity bias as the U-shaped relationship between 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐵𝑖𝑎𝑠𝑠 
and private ratings 𝑠, indicating that customers who are at the extreme ends of the private rating scale 
engage in online WOM disproportionately more than those with moderate private ratings. 
The proportion of customers with an online rating of 𝑠 on the review website will be equal to their 
proportion in the original population if and only if 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐵𝑖𝑎𝑠𝑠
𝑢𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑙 = 1. Therefore, if this 
condition is satisfied, then the online ratings will be representative of the experiences of the original 
customers with a private rating of 𝑠. This relationship only applies to a specific private rating of 𝑠. In 
order to evaluate the representativeness of the unsolicited online rating distribution, I introduce the 
well-known Kullback-Leibler divergence (Kullback 1997) measure and label it as 
𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒. It is calculated as 
 
𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 = 𝐷𝐾𝐿(𝛼||𝛼
𝑢𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑙)
= −∑ 𝛼𝑠 ∗ log (
𝛼𝑠
𝑢𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑙
𝛼𝑠
) = −∑ 𝛼𝑠 ∗ log(𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐵𝑖𝑎𝑠𝑠
𝑢𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑙).
𝑠𝑠
 
(3) 
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While the Kullback-Leibler divergence is not symmetric (i.e., 𝐷𝐾𝐿(𝑃||𝑄) ≠ 𝐷𝐾𝐿(𝑄||𝑃) and thus is not a 
true metric, it is a measure of how one probability distribution is different from a second reference 
probability distribution. Its appeal lies in both its popularity (e.g., Anderson and Simester 2014) and 
the fact that it captures the distance between two probability distributions using a single parameter 
value. Typically, 𝐷𝐾𝐿(𝑃||𝑄) is interpreted as the amount of information lost when 𝑄 is used to 
approximate 𝑃, which usually presents the “true” distribution of data. A representativeness score of 0 
indicates that the two distributions are identical. Further, the closer the representative score to 0, the 
more representative the rating distribution is of 𝛼. Consequently, I can determine whether a solicited 
online rating distribution is more representative than an unsolicited one by evaluating whether the 
unsolicited representativeness score defined in equation (3) is greater than and statistically 
significantly different from its solicited counterpart.     
3.2. Solicitation Effect 
If the firm solicits all its customers to post an online rating on the website, the proportion of reviewers 
with a solicited online rating of 𝑠 on the website is calculated as  
 𝛼𝑠
𝑠𝑜𝑙 =
𝑁𝑅𝑠
𝑠𝑜𝑙
𝑁𝑅𝑠𝑜𝑙
=
𝑁𝑠 ∗ 𝑝𝑠
𝑠𝑜𝑙
𝑁 ∗ 𝑝𝑎𝑣𝑔
𝑠𝑜𝑙 = 𝛼𝑠 ∗
𝑝𝑠
𝑠𝑜𝑙
𝑝𝑎𝑣𝑔
𝑠𝑜𝑙 , (4) 
where 𝑝𝑎𝑣𝑔
𝑠𝑜𝑙 =∑ 𝛼𝑠 ∗ 𝑝𝑠
𝑠𝑜𝑙
𝑠 . The reporting bias in solicited ratings is correspondingly determined by 
𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐵𝑖𝑎𝑠𝑠
𝑠𝑜𝑙 =
𝑝𝑠
𝑠𝑜𝑙
𝑝𝑎𝑣𝑔
𝑠𝑜𝑙 . Let 𝐿𝑖𝑓𝑡𝑠 =
𝑝𝑠
𝑠𝑜𝑙
𝑝𝑠
 and 𝐿𝑖𝑓𝑡𝑎𝑣𝑔 =
𝑝𝑎𝑣𝑔
𝑠𝑜𝑙
𝑝𝑎𝑣𝑔
. I can then re-write the equation in 
(4) as  
 𝛼𝑠
𝑠𝑜𝑙 = 𝛼𝑠 ∗
𝑝𝑠
𝑝𝑎𝑣𝑔
∗
𝑝𝑠
𝑠𝑜𝑙
𝑝𝑠
𝑝𝑎𝑣𝑔
𝑠𝑜𝑙
𝑝𝑎𝑣𝑔
= 𝛼𝑠 ∗ 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐵𝑖𝑎𝑠𝑠
𝑢𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑙 ∗
𝐿𝑖𝑓𝑡𝑠
𝐿𝑖𝑓𝑡𝑎𝑣𝑔
 .  (5) 
As a result, if there is any reporting bias in unsolicited online ratings, it is counteracted by the 
ratio of 
𝐿𝑖𝑓𝑡𝑠
𝐿𝑖𝑓𝑡𝑎𝑣𝑔
 in solicited online ratings. I define this ratio as the solicitation effect:  
 𝑆𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 =
𝐿𝑖𝑓𝑡𝑠
𝐿𝑖𝑓𝑡𝑎𝑣𝑔
 , (6) 
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where 𝐿𝑖𝑓𝑡𝑠 measures the magnitude by which solicitations increase the probability of review writing 
for customers with a private rating of 𝑠, and 𝐿𝑖𝑓𝑡𝑎𝑣𝑔 is the weighted average of all 𝐿𝑖𝑓𝑡𝑠’s with a 
weight of 
𝛼𝑠∗𝑝𝑠
∑ 𝛼𝑠∗𝑝𝑠𝑠
 for each rating 𝑠. After soliciting all customers, the proportion of customers with a 
public rating of 𝑠 on the review website will be equal to their original proportion in the entire 
population if and only if 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐵𝑖𝑎𝑠𝑠
𝑢𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑙 ∗  𝑆𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 = 1. Therefore, if 
𝑆𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 is equal to 1, then the reporting bias in unsolicited online ratings of 𝑠 will be 
identical to the one in solicited online ratings of 𝑠. However, if 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐵𝑖𝑎𝑠𝑠
𝑢𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑙 < 1 and 
𝑆𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 > 1 (𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐵𝑖𝑎𝑠𝑠
𝑢𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑙 > 1 and 𝑆𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 < 1), then 
underreporting (overreporting) bias in unsolicited online ratings of 𝑠 will be more than that in  
solicited online ratings of 𝑠. Consequently, solicitations have the potential to either mitigate or 
exacerbate the extremity bias in unsolicited online ratings, and the solicitation effect defined in 
equation (6) reveals the ultimate outcome.  
4. Data 
4.1. Company Background 
Individual-level satisfaction survey data used in this study were provided by a major hotel group that 
wishes to remain anonymous. The hotel group outsources the administration of satisfaction surveys to 
a global market research company and uses surveys to track the performance of more than 4,000 
hotels in its portfolio. Every month the hotel group administers anywhere between 10 and 100 surveys 
for each hotel, depending on the hotel’s size. The average number of surveys conducted per hotel was 
40 surveys per month from January of 2012 to May of 2015. The data include all surveys collected 
during this timeframe.  
The hotel group manages a loyalty program with three tiers. Typically, loyalty program members 
collect points for each qualifying stay and redeem them for free stays in the future. Members move 
between tiers depending on their purchasing activity and accumulated number of points. An 
individual who signs up for the loyalty program is assigned a membership ID that enables the 
company to track the individual’s behavior over time at the hotel group. The data include stay 
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behavior of all loyalty program members between January of 2011 and May of 2015. Unfortunately, it 
is not feasible for the company to track behaviors such as purchases, satisfaction surveys, and online 
reviews of those customers who are not loyalty program members. For that reason, the data are 
restricted to observations from loyalty program members.1 It is also difficult for the hotel group to 
reach out to non-members since their contact information is not readily available. This is also 
reflected by their low participation rate in surveys. Only 20% of all surveys filled out were from non-
members, whereas the remaining 80% came from loyalty program members (57% from the basic Tier 
1, 12% from the higher Tier 2, and 11% from Tier 3). Satisfaction survey invitations are sent via 
emails, and the average response rate is approximately 2%.  
4.2. Timing of Surveys 
All customers used in the analysis completed a customer satisfaction survey. In the data, 89% of all 
email invitations for surveys were sent exactly two days after the guest’s check-out. The next most 
probable two scenarios were sending the survey request three (6%) or four days (2%) following the 
guest’s stay. All remaining survey requests were emailed within eight days of check-out. On average, 
guests took 4.3 days to complete their survey. More than 92% of collected surveys were completed 
within 13 days of receiving the email request. 
4.3. Solicitation Procedure 
In 2012, the hotel group enabled its guests to leave online reviews on its website. The majority (78%) 
of its hotels had at least one review on the hotel’s website by December of 2012. In an attempt to 
increase the number of reviews posted on its website, the hotel group in 2014 started soliciting 
randomly selected survey takers to post their hotel experience as an online review upon completion of 
their survey. I label the act of asking survey takers to submit an online review on the hotel’s website 
as solicitation and divide survey takers into two groups: (1) solicited survey takers (SST) – survey 
takers who were solicited to write an online review, and (2) unsolicited survey takers (UST) – 
 
1 Online review rating and survey rating distributions of loyalty program members bear close resemblance to 
that of non-members. These distributions are provided in Appendix A. 
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customers who took the survey but were not solicited to write an online review. I define a reviewer as 
any survey taker (either solicited or unsolicited) who writes an online review on the hotel website. I 
refer to an SST who writes an online review following the solicitation procedure as a solicited 
reviewer (SR), whereas a solicited non-reviewer (SNR) is an SST who does not write an online 
review despite being solicited.  
SSTs could post their experiences as online reviews following the steps illustrated in Appendix 
B.2 In order to streamline the process of posting an online review through solicitation, the hotel group 
automatically generates online ratings based on SSTs’ survey ratings. Customers report survey ratings 
on a scale from 1 to 10. Survey ratings are only observed by the firm and the researcher, and are 
considered to be private ratings of survey takers (I therefore use the terms survey ratings and private 
ratings interchangeably in this research). When converting survey ratings into online ratings out of 
five, the hotel group simply divides the survey rating by two and rounds it up to the nearest integer 
value. For example, a survey rating of 5 (or 6) is automatically converted into an online rating of 3. 
The hotel group presents converted ratings to SSTs, and reviewers are allowed to change their online 
ratings if they disagree with the converted ratings provided by the hotel group, as illustrated in Step 2 
in Appendix B.3 Online reviews are made public on the hotel website (the terms online ratings and 
public ratings are also used interchangeably throughout this paper). 
The rest of the reviewers are unsolicited reviewers (UR) who also received an email from the 
hotel and took the survey but were not solicited to write an online review at the conclusion of the 
survey. Nevertheless, these customers went to the hotel website and wrote a review on their own 
initiative (those URs that did not write a review I refer to as unsolicited non-reviewers or UNRs). In 
Appendix C, I present steps URs have to follow on the hotel’s website to submit an online review.4 
 
2 In the final step of the solicitation procedure, SSTs are allowed to opt out of posting their review. The data do 
not allow me to differentiate between SSTs who rejected the solicitation and those who opted out of submitting 
their review in the final step of the solicitation procedure. Both types of SSTs are recorded as not posting an 
online review in the data. 
3 I recognize that many SSTs may post these converted ratings out of inertia even though they are given the 
opportunity to change them; I take this point into consideration in my analysis. 
4 Guidelines provided to URs are exactly the same as SRs. Very minor differences observed (between guidelines 
seen in Appendices A and B) are due to different timing of documentation. 
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URs and SRs are required to answer the same set of questions in the same order and are subject to the 
same requirements for submitting an online review (e.g., in both settings, review title and at least 50 
characters of review text are required).  
However, there is a stark difference between these two groups of reviewers – whether or not they 
were exposed to reviews already posted on the hotel website. To submit an online review, URs must 
first navigate to the website of the specific hotel for which they want to submit the review. The 
website displays summary statistics of previously posted reviews right next to the “write a review” 
button. These summary statistics include the average rating of previously posted reviews and the total 
number of reviews posted to date. Additionally, the same webpage displays the ratings and full texts 
of the last eight reviews. After clicking the “write a review” button, the same summary statistics are 
displayed in the top left corner of the form, as shown in Appendix C. These summary statistics are 
always shown in the top left corner, even when URs scroll down to fill out the entire online review 
form. On the other hand, as documented in Appendix B, SRs are not exposed to preexisting online 
reviews at any point during the solicitation procedure. While it cannot be assumed that SRs are 
completely unaware of preexisting online reviews (because they may have navigated to the hotel’s 
website on their own or may have seen these reviews at other instances, such as at the time of 
booking), I argue that they are less likely to have seen preexisting online reviews at the time of 
posting because such information is not readily provided to them in the process of review creation.  
One might suspect that the hotel group may be interested in soliciting online reviews primarily 
from extremely satisfied survey takers, but I do not observe that in the data. Figure 1 shows that 
regardless of the survey rating, on average, 25% of surveys are selected for review solicitation. 
Additionally, given that the satisfaction survey administration is outsourced to a third-party market 
research company, it is harder for the hotel group to engage in such strategic behavior through review 
solicitation. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for SSTs and USTs separately. These statistics 
confirm that differences between these two groups are also minimal in characteristics other than 
survey ratings, offering additional reassurance regarding the effectiveness of randomization.  
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
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[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
4.4. Timeline of Events 
I use two cohorts of survey takers in my analysis. The first cohort consists of those who completed a 
survey in 2013 just before the hotel group started its review solicitation initiative (see Figure 2). 
Cohort 1 was only used to estimate posting potential models, which are described below. That is the 
only way their data are used. Cohort 2 consists of those who took surveys administered between 
January of 2014 and May of 2015. Survey takers in Cohort 2 were subject to random review 
solicitations. I draw on Cohort 2 survey takers to measure the impact of solicitations and conformity. 
 Cohort 2 consists of 389,789 survey takers that can be divided into the four groups (SR, SNR, 
UR, and UNR) described in section 4.3. Figure 3 summarizes all four of them.   
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
[Insert Figure 3 here] 
 
Researchers have found that some online reviews are submitted by customers with no record of 
ever purchasing the product they are reviewing (Anderson and Simester 2014). However, such 
reviews are less likely to exist in the current study because the hotel group confirms guests before 
they can submit a review by requiring a reservation identification code, guest name, and check-in and 
check-out dates. As a caveat, other self-promotion tactics, which I am unaware of, could exist on the 
company website. Data on customer satisfaction surveys, solicitation requests, purchase histories, and 
loyalty program membership were provided by the hotel group, and I scraped all online reviews 
(approximately 1.5 million) posted on the hotel group’s website. I found that 82% of these online 
reviews were posted by loyalty program members. I observed that 50% of all reviewers on the hotel 
group’s website belonged to membership Tier 1, 14% to Tier 2, and 17% to Tier 3. These statistics are 
very similar to their survey participation rate. I constructed my comprehensive data set by matching 
scraped online reviews to company-provided surveys using unique combinations of membership ID 
and reservation identification codes. I excluded from my analysis survey takers whose membership 
enrollment date is unknown or whose stay was paid by their employer.  
4.5. Model Free Evidence 
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In this section, I provide model free evidence on how survey ratings and review solicitations influence 
survey takers’ probability of writing an online review and their online ratings. I present survey ratings 
across different types of survey takers in Figure 4. Given random solicitation, the distribution of 
survey ratings across SSTs and USTs is almost identical. However, I observe that survey ratings of 
both SRs and SNRs (URs and UNRs) differ considerably from their original SSTs (USTs) customer 
base. For instance, the proportion of highly dissatisfied customers (those with a survey rating of less 
than or equal to 4 out of 10) is much higher in URs (10%) than in USTs (5%). Similarly, the 
proportion of extremely satisfied customers (those with a survey rating of 10 out of 10) is much 
higher in SRs (43%) than in SSTs (35%). These observations suggest that the online review writing 
probability of highly dissatisfied USTs is much higher than the average online review writing 
probability across all USTs (i.e., 𝑝1, 𝑝2, 𝑝3, 𝑝4 > 𝑝𝑎𝑣𝑔) and that the solicitation acceptance rate of 
highly satisfied SSTs is higher than the average solicitation acceptance rate across all SSTs (i.e., 
𝑝10
𝑠𝑜𝑙 > 𝑝𝑎𝑣𝑔
𝑠𝑜𝑙 ). These probabilities are presented in Figure 5. Regardless of solicitation, a U-shaped 
relationship clearly exists between survey ratings and online WOM activity.  
[Insert Figure 4 here] 
[Insert Figure 5 here] 
 
Next, I document differences in rating adjustments made by SRs and URs. Figure 6 shows the 
percentage of URs and SRs at each rating level who downgraded, upgraded, or maintained their 
survey rating when posting it online. By visual inspection, it is clear that URs adjusted their ratings in 
both directions much more often than SRs. More specifically, Figure 6 demonstrates that compared to 
URs, SRs are less likely to post an online rating different from their survey rating. For instance, 
consider reviewers whose survey rating is 2. Figure 6 shows that SRs submit an online rating of 1 
(i.e., maintain their survey rating) 96% of the time, whereas URs only maintain the same rating 60% 
of the time. There is a 40% chance that an UR will submit an online rating of more than or equal to 2 
(upgrade), whereas SRs only upgrade 4% of the time.  
[Insert Figure 6 here] 
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One obvious explanation for this behavioral difference between SRs and URs could be timing. 
Review solicitations are made right after survey completion, so for SRs the time between survey and 
online review is very short. On the other hand, 59% of URs carried out these two actions on separate 
days. Conceivably, URs could misremember their survey ratings and this could potentially explain 
their rating behavior observed in Figure 6. Unfortunately, I do not observe the exact hour when a 
survey is completed, or an online review is written. Instead, I have a record of the date reviewers 
carried out these two actions. Given this available information, I reproduced Figure 6 using 
observations from URs who filled out their survey and online review on the same day. Figure 7 
illustrates that timing only slightly contributes to their rating adjustments reported in Figure 6. Next, I 
provide details of the empirical analysis implemented.   
[Insert Figure 7 here] 
5. Analysis and Results 
5.1. Model Specification 
Consistent with my research focus, I examined two outcome variables of interest: (1) online review 
writing incidence, a binary outcome variable that indicates whether a survey taker writes an online 
review on the hotel website, and (2) rating adjustment, an ordinal outcome variable that measures the 
internal adjustment that a survey taker makes to a survey rating while posting a public online rating 
(and that is only observed conditional on writing an online review). I model online review writing 
incidence (binary outcome) and rating adjustment (ordinal outcome) as two separate but related 
processes using a Heckman model as follows.  
5.1.1. Online Review Writing Incidence Model. The binary outcome variable 𝑝𝑖ℎ𝑡 = 1 indicates 
that a survey taker writes an online review on the hotel website for their stay at hotel h at time t. I 
model this variable using a probit model as follows: 
 𝑝𝑖ℎ𝑡 = 1(𝑍𝑖ℎ𝑡𝛽 + 𝑣𝑖ℎ𝑡 > 0), (7) 
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where 𝑍𝑖ℎ𝑡 consists of the covariates used to model the online review writing process, 1(·) is an 
indicator function, and 𝑣𝑖ℎ𝑡 is an idiosyncratic error term following a standard normal distribution 
with a mean of 0.  
Figure 5 demonstrates that the relationship between survey rating and probability of writing an 
online review is nonlinear. In order to capture this potentially asymmetric U-shaped relationship, I 
include a dummy variable for each level of survey rating, 𝑠𝑖ℎ𝑡, as covariates in 𝑍𝑖ℎ𝑡. Further, given my 
interest in understanding the causal impact of solicitations on online review writing behavior, I also 
include solicitation dummy variable in 𝑍𝑖ℎ𝑡. I allow the impact of solicitations to be different for each 
survey rating by including interaction terms between survey rating dummy variables and the 
solicitation dummy variable in 𝑍𝑖ℎ𝑡.  
Even though solicitations are random, I recognize that I am working with field data and should 
control for as many observed factors (that could impact online review writing incidence) as possible 
in a parsimonious way. To this end, I construct a variable called posting potential and include it in 
𝑍𝑖ℎ𝑡. I create the posting potential variable by estimating a separate probit model on Cohort 1, where 
the dependent variable is whether Cohort 1 survey takers write an online review, and the independent 
variables are those I expected would predict whether a hotel guest would write an online review aside 
from my main independent variables of interest. These variables include guest characteristics such as 
gender and loyalty program membership, hotel characteristics such as chain scale, and stay 
characteristics such as nightly price paid (see Appendix D for a complete list of independent variables 
and the estimation results). Because these same variables are available for Cohort 2, I use Cohort 1 
parameter estimates to predict the likelihood that the survey taker would write an online review in the 
absence of a review solicitation. This prediction, labeled posting potential, is included as an additional 
covariate in the Cohort 2 probit model. Note that I do not expect the inclusion of the posting potential 
variable to change any of the parameter estimates of interest for the online review writing incidence 
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model (Montaguti, Neslin, and Valentini 2016), but I report results with and without it to be 
thorough.5  
5.1.2. Rating Adjustment Model. The ordinal outcome variable, 𝑎𝑖ℎ𝑡, captures the difference 
between 𝑠𝑖ℎ𝑡, survey rating by reviewer i for hotel h at time t, and 𝑜𝑖ℎ𝑡, the online rating posted by the 
same guest on the hotel h’s website. More specifically, for a given reviewer i following their stay at 
hotel h at time t,     
 𝑎𝑖ℎ𝑡 =
{
 
 
 
 −1          𝑖𝑓 𝑜𝑖ℎ𝑡 −
𝑠𝑖ℎ𝑡
2
< 0
0          𝑖𝑓 𝑜𝑖ℎ𝑡 −
𝑠𝑖ℎ𝑡
2
= 0
 1          𝑖𝑓 𝑜𝑖ℎ𝑡 −
𝑠𝑖ℎ𝑡
2
> 0
, (8) 
where 𝑠𝑖ℎ𝑡𝜖 {2,4,6,8,10} is the survey rating reported privately to the hotel group (on a scale from 1 to 
10) and 𝑜𝑖ℎ𝑡𝜖 {1,2,3,4,5} is the online rating posted publicly on the hotel website (on a scale from 1 to 
5).6 Conditional on online review writing incidence, a negative (positive) 𝑎𝑖ℎ𝑡 value signifies that the 
reviewer made a downward (upward) adjustment to their survey rating while posting an online rating. 
Odd survey ratings are excluded from Heckman model estimation because of the automatic rounding 
employed by the firm. The reasoning is as follows: consider a SR and an UR whose survey rating is 
6.8 out of 10. They would both report a survey rating of 7 out of 10. Subsequently, the SR’s online 
rating would automatically be generated as 4 out of 5 (due to the automatic rounding up rule), which 
he is very likely to post out of inertia. However, the UR would mentally convert her experience to 3.4 
out of 5 and most probably post an online rating of 3 out of 5. This example illustrates the potential 
bias that an automatic rounding rule introduces in rating adjustments and how it could skew 𝑎𝑖ℎ𝑡 
values upwards for SRs. For this reason, I only rely on observations with even survey ratings since the 
rounding problem described is only present for odd numbers.   
 
5 Moreover, results do not change when I directly include all factors as control variables in Ziht. These results are available 
from the author upon request.   
6 Alternatively, I can set 𝑎𝑖ℎ𝑡 = 𝑜𝑖ℎ𝑡 −
𝑠𝑖ℎ𝑡
2
. This alternative specification results in nine distinct values ranging from -4 to 4 
for the ordinal outcome variable, 𝑎𝑖ℎ𝑡. Results from this alternative specification are identical and are presented Table E2 in 
Appendix E. For exposition purposes, I chose to include the more parsimonious specification in the paper. This decision was 
also based on the observation that reviewers typically upgrade or downgrade their survey ratings by 1 or maintain it. I 
include this transition matrix in Table E1 in Appendix E, as well.  
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If 𝑎𝑖ℎ𝑡 takes the value of zero, the reviewer maintains their survey rating as their online rating. 
Therefore, a non-zero value of 𝑎𝑖ℎ𝑡 indicates a reporting bias, which I am capturing by the rating 
adjustment model. I model rating adjustments using an ordered probit specification as follows: 
 Pr(𝑎𝑖ℎ𝑡 = 𝑘|𝑝𝑖ℎ𝑡 = 1) = Pr(𝜇𝑘+1 < 𝑋𝑖ℎ𝑡𝛽 + 𝑢𝑖ℎ𝑡 ≤ 𝜇𝑘+2) , 𝑘 ∈ {−1, 0, 1} ,    (9) 
where 𝑝𝑖ℎ𝑡 = 1 indicates that an online review is posted following the hotel stay (and 𝑝𝑖ℎ𝑡 = 0 
otherwise), 𝑋𝑖ℎ𝑡 is a vector of covariates, and 𝑢𝑖ℎ𝑡 is the random error following a standard normal 
distribution with a mean of 0. Error terms (𝑢𝑖ℎ𝑡, 𝑣𝑖ℎ𝑡) follow a bivariate normal distribution with mean 
zero and variance matrix [
1    𝜌
𝜌    1
]. Consequently, the probability that an adjustment of 𝑘 is made can be 
represented by 
 Pr(𝑎𝑖ℎ𝑡 = 𝑘|𝑝𝑖ℎ𝑡 = 1) = {
  Φ(𝜇0 − 𝑋𝑖ℎ𝑡𝛽),                                               𝑘 = −1 
Φ(𝜇1 − 𝑋𝑖ℎ𝑡𝛽) − Φ(𝜇0 − 𝑋𝑖ℎ𝑡𝛽),                𝑘 = 0
 1 − Φ(𝜇1 − 𝑋𝑖ℎ𝑡𝛽),                                        𝑘 = 1
, (10) 
where 𝜇 are cutoff points for the ordered probit model and Φ(·) denotes the standard normal 
cumulative distribution function. I allow for two factors to influence a reviewer’s rating adjustment 
decision: (1) solicitations and (2) conformity. In order to capture conformity, I create an independent 
variable, which measures the difference between a reviewer’s survey rating and the hotel’s preexisting 
average online rating on the hotel website on the day that she writes her review. I label this variable 
Deviation from others and calculate it as 
 𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖ℎ𝑡 =
𝑠𝑖ℎ𝑡
2
− 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐴𝑣𝑔𝑂𝑛𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖ℎ𝑡 . (11) 
I would like to emphasize the difference between the ordinal dependent variable (rating 
adjustment) and the independent variable (deviation from others). The former measures the internal 
rating adjustment that a reviewer makes to its private rating while posting it publicly, whereas the 
latter quantifies how much a reviewer’s private rating differs from the already-existing average online 
rating of others on the hotel website.7 A negative (positive) deviation from others indicates that the 
 
7 For example, consider a reviewer whose survey rating is 6/10 and online rating is 4/5 for a hotel whose average rating on 
the hotel website is 4.5/5. In this instance the deviation from others is (
6
2
− 4.5) = −1.5 and the ordinal DV is +1 (since 4 −
6
2
> 0).  The reviewer’s personal experience at the hotel was worse than the average experience reported on the hotel 
website, yet he upgrades his survey rating from 6/10 to 4/5 while posting his online rating. 
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reviewer’s personal experience at the hotel is worse (better) than an average experience reported on 
the hotel website. I estimated model parameters using maximum likelihood approach.  
In order to test for the existence of conformity, I adopt a difference in differences type 
specification and include the solicitation dummy variable, the deviation from others variable, and their 
interaction in 𝑋𝑖ℎ𝑡. With this specification, the evidence for the existence of conformity reduces to 
testing the statistical significance of the interaction term. If the impact of deviation from others is 
different between URs and SRs, this provides strong evidence for conformity. This identification 
strategy is justified for several reasons.  
First, the likelihood of exposure to online reviews of others is different for SRs and URs. On the 
one hand, an UR is definitely exposed to online reviews of others because she has to navigate to the 
company website and click on a button that is right next to others’ reviews in order to submit her 
online review. On the other hand, a SR is less likely to be exposed to online reviews of others because 
he submits his online review through the automated process, which omits any information about the 
online reviews of others. I cannot completely rule out that he did not check others’ ratings by 
navigating to the company website on his own account, but clearly this action requires additional 
effort, and therefore a portion of SRs may not go to any lengths to find out about others’ ratings. Still, 
a portion of them may do so, but this possibility only makes it harder for me to find a statistically 
significant interaction term.  
Second, solicitation was carried out at random. Random assignment ensures that there are no 
differences between USTs and SSTs, and both URs and SRs self-select into writing a review from the 
unsolicited and solicited survey taker groups, respectively. Additionally, the effort required to write 
an online review is similar for both groups, as they are asked the same set of questions in the same 
order and are subject to the same requirements while creating their online review. Lastly, I control for 
any remaining self-selection differences that may exist between URs and SRs by specifically 
modeling online review incidence, and the Heckman type model allows me to control for selection on 
unobservable characteristics since I allow for error terms (𝑢𝑖ℎ𝑡, 𝑣𝑖ℎ𝑡) to be correlated.  
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5.2. Relationship Between Private Ratings and Probability of Writing an Online Review 
I report the probit model parameter estimates in Table 2 and illustrate the relationship between survey 
ratings and online review incidence in Figure 8. I find that online review posting behavior of both 
SSTs and USTs exhibits extremity bias. This contributes to the overrepresentation of extreme 
experiences in both solicited and unsolicited online ratings. For instance, the estimated reporting bias 
for a survey rating of 10 in the SST group is 1.2, which indicates that the proportion of private ratings 
of 5 in SRs is 20% more than the proportion of private ratings of 10 in the SST group. This finding is 
consistent with data patterns observed in Figure 4, which shows that the proportion of SSTs with a 
survey rating of 10 is 35% in private ratings, whereas the proportion of SRs with the same survey 
rating is 43% in online ratings, indicating an approximately 20% increase in proportion. 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
[Insert Figure 8 here] 
 
Even though both USTs and SSTs display extremity bias, there are stark differences in their reporting 
biases. First, the extremity bias is asymmetric in the UST group. Consequently, the overrepresentation 
of extremely dissatisfactory experiences in online reviews by URs is higher than the 
overrepresentation of dissatisfied SRs in online reviews. Second, the results show that the extremity 
bias is stronger amongst USTs. This is also reflected in both group’s representativeness scores. The 
representativeness score for the unsolicited private rating distribution (0.078) is significantly different 
from its solicited counterpart (0.016) (p<0.001), meaning that the private rating distribution of SRs is 
more representative of the underlying customer experiences than that of URs. Next, I discuss why the 
extremity bias is less severe in solicited online ratings than unsolicited ones.  
5.3. Impact of Solicitation on Probability of Writing an Online Review 
The probabilities in Figure 8 demonstrate that solicitations significantly increase online WOM 
creation. I am certain that there were no incentives tied to an online review solicitation. However, I 
acknowledge that the magnitude of the solicitation effect seems rather large, especially compared to 
what is reported in previous work (e.g., Burtch et al. 2017). The well-known foot-in-the-door 
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technique provides an explanation for the observed high solicitation acceptance rate. Freedman and 
Fraser's (1966) seminal investigation of the foot-in-the-door technique demonstrated that individuals 
are more likely to comply with a large request after responding affirmatively to a smaller request. 
More specifically, they reported that 52.8% of individuals complied with a large request after 
completing a smaller request. This compliance rate is consistent with the solicitation acceptance rate I 
report.8 In my setup, SSTs first agreed to fill out a survey from the company, and it is plausible that 
their basic desire for consistency drove them to greatly comply with the subsequent online review 
solicitation (Cialdini and Goldstein 2004). 
Solicitation has an impact on review writing, but this impact may not be even across the 
satisfaction spectrum. In order to show the solicitation effect, defined in equation (6), I created Figure 
9 to illustrate the 95% confidence intervals for each 𝐿𝑖𝑓𝑡𝑠 and the 𝐿𝑖𝑓𝑡𝑎𝑣𝑔. It demonstrates that the 
average solicitation effect is highest for moderate experiences with survey ratings of 7 and 8. Based 
on Figure 8, their reporting bias in unsolicited online WOM is 0.5 and 0.6, respectively. These 
customers are highly unlikely to engage in unsolicited online WOM activity despite comprising 30% 
of the original customer base and are therefore underrepresented in private ratings of URs. However, 
both 𝐿𝑖𝑓𝑡7 and 𝐿𝑖𝑓𝑡8 are statistically significantly different from 𝐿𝑖𝑓𝑡𝑎𝑣𝑔 (p<0.01). This suggests that 
the solicitation effects for these ratings are higher than 1, and their underrepresentation in private 
ratings of SRs is much less compared to URs.  
Similarly, 𝐿𝑖𝑓𝑡1, 𝐿𝑖𝑓𝑡2, 𝐿𝑖𝑓𝑡3, 𝐿𝑖𝑓𝑡4 and 𝐿𝑖𝑓𝑡10 are statistically different from 𝐿𝑖𝑓𝑡𝑎𝑣𝑔 (p<0.02). 
The solicitation effects for these ratings are lower than 1, suggesting that solicitations significantly 
reduce their overrepresentation in private ratings of SRs. In summary, the solicitation effect 
counteracts the extremity bias documented in private ratings of URs, greatly improving the 
representativeness of the private ratings of SRs.  
[Insert Figure 9 here]    
 
8 I argue that asking to post an online review is a bigger request than asking to fill out a satisfaction survey 
because online reviewers are required to provide review text (as well as a review title) and are expected to 
provide justifications for their online ratings. On the other hand, it is optional for survey takers to provide 
comments in the survey, and they do not have to defend their opinions publicly.  
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5.4. Impact of Solicitation on Rating Adjustments 
Table 3 reports parameter estimates of the Heckman model. I focus on the impact of solicitations on 
rating adjustments since results pertaining to review writing incidence are identical to what was 
discussed previously. The coefficient estimate for the solicited dummy variable measures the marginal 
effect of solicitations when (the customer’s private survey rating) deviation from (the average online 
rating of reviews posted by) others is zero. I report the 95% confidence intervals of this effect in 
Figure 10, which shows that the effect is strongest and positive on the probability to maintain (survey 
ratings). It suggests that reviewers are slightly more likely to maintain the same survey rating as their 
online rating when they are solicited for a review. This is not surprising given that the company 
automatically converts survey ratings into corresponding online ratings and reviewers may succumb 
to inertia instead of altering the rating. However, this effect is statistically insignificant. Therefore, I 
conclude that URs and SRs are equally likely to downgrade, maintain, or upgrade their survey rating 
when their experience is consistent with the preexisting average experience reported on the hotel 
website.  
[Insert Table 3 here] 
[Insert Figure 10 here]    
 
5.5. Impact of Conformity on Rating Adjustments 
The marginal effect of solicitations on rating adjustment is statistically significant when deviation 
from others is non-zero. Figure 11 shows that the marginal effect of solicitation on the probability to 
upgrade is, on average, -13% when the survey rating is 6 and deviation from others is -1.7. This 
means that a SR with a survey rating of 6 is 13% less likely to upgrade than an UR with the same 
rating when the preexisting average rating on the hotel website is 4.7/5. Similarly, an extremely 
satisfied SR with a survey rating of 10 is, on average, 9% less likely to downgrade than an UR with 
the same experience when the preexisting average on the hotel website is 3.7/5.  
As explained previously, in order to establish the existence of conformity, I am ultimately 
interested in the interaction effect. It is widely known that interaction effects in nonlinear models 
 27 
 
cannot be interpreted simply by looking at the estimated interaction coefficient. I derive the correct 
interaction effect and its standard deviation by using the method described in Ai and Norton (2003), 
and report them in Figure 12 (see Appendix G for derived formulas and figures depicting remaining 
interaction effects). The statistically significant interaction effects confirm the existence of conformity 
in rating adjustments; URs, who are more likely to be exposed to preexisting reviews than SRs, alter 
their ratings to a greater degree than SRs as their private ratings deviate from the average online 
ratings. On a related note, consistent with the finding in section 5.4, marginal effects of solicitations 
are primarily driven by the interaction effect between deviation from others and whether the review 
was solicited.  
[Insert Figure 11 here] 
[Insert Figure 12 here] 
 
5.6. Robustness Checks 
5.6.1. Previous Stay Histories. Previous stay histories raise two concerns for rating adjustment 
results: (1) customers may adjust their online ratings based on their previous experiences, and (2) 
frequent customers may misremember the hotel they are reviewing. If URs were disproportionately 
more likely to have previous stays than SRs, then these two factors could explain why they also tend 
to change their survey ratings more than SRs. Since I am able to track all survey takers starting from 
their first-ever hotel stay at the hotel group, I re-estimated the model using observations restricted to 
first-ever hotel stays. All previous findings are replicated by Model 2.1 presented in Table 4.  
[Insert Table 4 here] 
5.6.2. Impact of Online Reviews at the Time of Booking. The data allow me to alleviate concerns 
about the impact of online reviews at the time of booking because I can differentiate between online 
and offline bookings, even though I cannot tell which website is used for online bookings. Thus, I 
repeated the same analysis using observations from offline bookings only. The idea is that since these 
guests did not book online, they are much less likely to be impacted by online ratings at the time of 
their booking. These results are presented in Table 4 under Model 2.2. Further, I observe the exact 
date that bookings are made. I performed an additional robustness check by using offline bookings 
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that were made at least 10 days, the median number of days between booking and check-out, before 
the guest’s check-out. Requiring the booking date to be at least 10 days before the check-out date 
means that it is harder for offline customers to recall online ratings if they were somehow exposed to 
them. Consequently, this condition is more stringent than the previous one. These results are 
presented in Table 4 under Model 2.3. Models 2.2 and 2.3 both confirm my previous findings on 
rating adjustments.  
5.6.3. Management Response. I observe managers responding to online reviews submitted at the 
hotel website. The data come from a period after all hotels had responded to at least one online 
review. The average response rate to satisfied customers is 50%. Managers are more responsive to 
unsatisfied customers, responding to all online reviews with a rating of 3 or less (out of 5). Managers’ 
responses to online reviews have been shown to impact subsequent reviews (Chevalier, Dover, and 
Mayzlin 2018; Proserpio and Zervas 2017). For that reason, ideally the data should come from an 
environment where management response is not undertaken.  
In light of findings from Chevalier, Dover, and Mayzlin (2018), management response could 
provide an alternative explanation for highly dissatisfied customers’ greater propensity to write an 
online review. If customers see that managers are listening, then they may be more likely to voice 
their frustration. Additionally, exposure to managers’ responses is likely to be different between SRs 
and URs, and this difference may explain observed rating adjustments by URs. In order to show that 
the effects identified in this study cannot be attributed to managers’ responses, I used the variation in 
observability of management response similar to Wang and Chaudhry (2018). Only the most recent 
eight reviews are displayed on the first page where potential reviewers have to navigate to post an 
online review for a given hotel. I thus restricted my analysis to observations from survey takers for 
whom there were no managerial responses to any of the last eight reviews displayed on the website at 
the time of their check-out. These survey takers were very unlikely to observe that managers had been 
responding to online reviews. I present these results in Table 4 under Model 2.4. These results 
replicate my previous findings on review writing incidence as well as rating adjustment.      
[Insert Table 5 here] 
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5.7. Overall Impact of Solicitations on Public Ratings for a Typical Hotel 
In this section, I describe how simulated public ratings of reviewers differ from their simulated private 
ratings and the private ratings of the original customer base. Figure 13 summarizes these differences. 
The distribution in Panel A illustrates the private ratings of a typical hotel’s original customer base in 
the data; its average private rating is 4.41 and the variance of its private ratings is 0.69. I regard this 
distribution as the original private rating distribution. Next, using the parameter estimates in Table 3, 
I simulate the expected private rating distributions of reviewers under two scenarios: (1) all 
individuals in the original customer base are solicited to write an online review (Panel B top) and (2) 
none of them are solicited (Panel B bottom). In other words, these distributions show the private 
ratings of SRs and URs when the original customer base is solicited and unsolicited, respectively. The 
difference between the distribution in Panel A and distributions in Panel B captures the extremity bias 
phenomenon. Subsequently, I present in Panel C the simulated public online rating distributions for 
when all reviewers were either solicited (Panel C top) or not solicited (Panel C bottom).9 I assess the 
impact of conformity by comparing the rating distributions in Panel B to those in Panel C.  
[Insert Figure 13 here] 
5.7.1. Impact on Representativeness. In line with my findings in section 5.2, I see that the 
simulated private rating distribution of SRs is more representative of the original customer 
experiences than that of URs (p<0.001). Surprisingly, conformity statistically significantly increases 
the representativeness of public online rating distribution of URs, decreasing the representativeness 
score in equation (3) from 0.066 to 0.033 (p<0.001). However, despite this increase, the public rating 
distribution of URs remains less representative than that of SRs (p=0.04). 
5.7.2. Impact on Valence and Variance of Ratings. In this section, I compare rating distributions 
based on two important online review metrics, valence and variance, that are shown to drive product 
sales (Babić Rosario et al. 2016). First, I observe that the average simulated private (4.52) and public 
 
9 The average online rating of a typical hotel in the data was 4.2/5 on December 31st, 2013, right before review 
solicitations were implemented. Therefore, I use 4.2 as the preexisting average online rating in estimating public 
ratings of reviews.  
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(4.51) ratings of SRs are statistically significantly different from the average private rating (4.41) of 
the original customer base (p<0.001). The same holds for URs (p<0.02). Even though the extremity 
bias exists, it does not lead to decreased average ratings. On the contrary, it increases average ratings 
because the majority of customers have extremely satisfactory experiences, and they are 
overrepresented in private (and public) ratings of reviewers. Because extremely satisfied customers 
are overrepresented to a similar degree in both SRs and URs, I do not find any statistically significant 
difference between the average simulated ratings of SRs (4.52, 4.51) and URs (4.50, 4.49) (p>0.45). 
Both solicited and unsolicited averages are equally overstated relative to the average private rating of 
the original customer base. This is particularly interesting because Figure 13 demonstrates 
considerable differences between the simulated private (and public) rating distributions of SRs and 
URs. 
Second, even though I do not find statistically significant differences in average private or public 
ratings of SRs and URs, their rating distributions exhibit stark differences, as shown in Figure 13. 
These differences manifest themselves in variances of private and public ratings of two groups. The 
variance of simulated private ratings of SRs (0.63) is statistically significantly lower than that of URs 
(0.90) (p<0.01). This difference is driven by the fact that extremity bias is more severe when 
customers are not solicited. As expected, the conformity effect reduces the variance of simulated 
public ratings of URs to 0.77. However, the variance of simulated public ratings of SRs (0.64) 
remains statistically significantly different from that of URs (p=0.04). I conclude that the variance of 
solicited public ratings would be lower than its unsolicited counterpart for a typical hotel in the data if 
all its customers were solicited to write an online review.  
5.8. Impact of Solicitations on Third-Party Review Platforms 
In section 5.3, I demonstrated that solicitations significantly increase online review writing behavior 
on the company website. A natural next question that follows the preceding analysis is, “Where does 
an additional online review induced by a solicitation come from?” There are two potential sources: 
(1) additional online reviews are written by individuals who would not write any online review on any 
website in absence of solicitation, or (2) they are written by individuals who would leave an online 
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review on another website but not on the company website. If additional reviews come from the 
second source, then solicitations could potentially shift online reviews from other review websites to 
the company website if individuals tend to leave only one review per experience. In this section, I 
delve deeper into the impact of solicitations on online review writing behavior at third-party review 
platforms.  
TripAdvisor.com is the leading third-party review website for hotels. Unfortunately, I am not 
aware of any technology that would allow researchers to trace TripAdvisor behavior back to an 
individual customer. However, the experiment conducted by the hotel group creates an opportunity to 
investigate whether solicitations impact reviewing behavior on TripAdvisor.com by using hotel-level 
aggregate data. The hotel company first tested out solicitations by implementing them on a small 
scale. From January 1st to January 7th of 2014, the hotel group randomly selected approximately 250 
hotels within its portfolio to experiment with soliciting reviews during these seven days before the 
portfolio-wide rollout of solicitations was implemented on May 28th of 2014. This natural experiment 
allowed me to construct two sets of hotels: (1) control hotels for which review solicitations started on 
May 28th, and (2) treated hotels for which review solicitation experimentation occurred between 
January 1st and 7th.  
I analyze the number of online reviews posted on TripAdvisor.com to identify the causal effects 
of review solicitations on online review writing behavior on a third-party review platform. I scraped 
online reviews from TripAdvisor.com only for hotels that are located in the United States. 
Availability of online reviews only for US hotels reduces the size of the treatment group to 151 hotels. 
The control group includes the remaining 2,140 hotels located in the US. The dependent variable of 
my analysis is the total number of reviews posted on TripAdvisor.com within 120 days. Even though 
the selection process was random, there are very small and statistically insignificant baseline 
differences between treated and control hotels. This is not unusual given that data are at the aggregate 
level. Therefore, I use DID analysis to account for statistically insignificant baseline differences. 
Figure 14 summarizes my research setup. 
[Insert Figure 14 here] 
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[Insert Figure 15 here] 
 
Because I am investigating whether the impact of solicitations differs depending on the review 
valence, I model the number of reviews for each five available ratings separately. Further, since the 
dependent variable is a count variable and the Poisson model assumptions are violated – because 
mean and variance of the dependent variable (number of reviews posted) differs greatly in data – I use 
negative binomial regression (NB2) to model it using the following DID specification. The expected 
number of online reviews on TripAdvisor.com, 𝑦, is modeled as  
 𝐸[𝑦|𝑥, 𝛽] = 𝑒
(𝛽0+𝛽1∗𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑+𝛽2∗𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡+𝛽3∗𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑∗𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡) . (12) 
The model parameters are estimated by maximizing the negative binomial log-likelihood 
function. I provide expected and observed probabilities for one-star reviews in Figure 15 (see 
Appendix F for expected and observed probabilities for all other star levels in Figure F1). NB2 model 
recovers observed data patterns well. I am interested in the interaction effect, which measures the 
treatment effect on the treated. I derive the correct interaction effect and its standard deviation by 
using the method described in Ai and Norton (2003) (see Appendix F for derived formulas for NB2) 
and present my results in Table 6.  
The results suggest that solicitations primarily shift one-star reviews from TripAdvisor to the 
company website. I do not find statistically significant effects for any other rating. Note that 
solicitations are launched to the entire hotel portfolio 120 days after the start of the experiment, and if 
the impact of solicitations on TripAdvisor takes longer than 120 days to materialize, then I may be 
missing some of the effects of solicitations. Figure 16 provides 95% confidence intervals for the 
percentage change in number of reviews for each rating. It shows that solicitations, on average, 
decrease the number of one-star reviews on the TripAdvisor website by 48%. This result suggests that 
online review solicitations for the company website could possibly increase the representativeness of 
online review distribution on a third-party review website if the asymmetric extremity bias also exists 
in such platforms.  
[Insert Table 6 here] 
[Insert Figure 16 here] 
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One plausible explanation as to why the effect exists only for one-star reviews could be that a 
reviewer who writes a one-star online review is only motivated to write this review due to that 
particular one-time awful experience, whereas a reviewer who writes a five-star online review could 
be interested in reviewing for the sake of reviewing (e.g., as a hobby). In other words, one-star 
reviewers do not gain any pleasure from the act of writing an online review, while five-star reviewers 
enjoy writing online reviews. Once a one-star reviewer writes an review on the company website they 
do not post additional reviews because they do not derive any intrinsic utility from posting them, 
whereas a five-star reviewer is more likely to post on multiple websites. I provide some evidence for 
this explanation in Table 7.  
Table 7 provides summary statistics from more than 1.6 million online reviews from the 
TripAdvisor website. In order to make sure that membership timing cannot explain away the statistics 
provided in Table 7, I focus on reviewers who posted an online review on the TripAdvisor website at 
least 400 days after and at most 500 days after joining the website. Table 7 shows two pieces of 
supporting evidence. First, the average number of online reviews (with any rating) written by an 
individual who wrote at least one one-star review is 22, whereas an individual who wrote at least one 
five-star review, on average, writes 32 online reviews. This observation lends support to the argument 
that one-star reviewers may derive much less intrinsic utility from the act of writing an online review 
(and therefore, on average, write fewer online reviews) compared to two-, three-, four-, and five-star 
reviewers. Otherwise, on average, they would also be posting similar number of reviews. Second, 
consistent with the same argument, Table 7 shows that a higher proportion (7.7%) of one-star online 
reviews are the only review ever written by an individual. Thus, reviewers who leave one-star online 
reviews are less likely to be habitual reviewers and more likely to be uniquely motivated to review by 
a particularly negative experience. Nonetheless, it remains a topic for future research to pinpoint the 
exact mechanism for why solicitations primarily shift one-star online reviews away from the third-
party website.  
6. Discussion 
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In this paper, I studied the representativeness of online WOM, primarily focusing on how extremity 
bias, conformity, and online review solicitations impact it. The findings can be split into four 
components. First, I showed that extremity bias exists in unsolicited online WOM. Customers who are 
extremely satisfied or extremely dissatisfied are more likely to engage in unsolicited online WOM 
than those with moderate experiences. Extremity bias thus reduces the representativeness of 
unsolicited online WOM. This finding offers a justification for companies to “manipulate” their 
online WOM to generate a more representative set of reviews and suggests that not all manipulation 
should be seen as fraudulent, since some could be used as a means to increase representativeness of 
online WOM.    
I documented a second set of findings that focuses on two mechanisms that significantly increase 
the representativeness of online review distributions: online review solicitations and conformity. First, 
even though the extremity bias persists in solicited online WOM, I show that it is greatly reduced 
relative to the extremity bias in unsolicited online WOM because the solicitation effect is greatest for 
moderate experiences and lowest for extreme experiences. Hence, review solicitations have the 
potential to de-bias online reviews to a certain extent. Second, the results indicate that conformity 
could counteract the extremity bias. Exposing prospective reviewers to preexisting online reviews 
could therefore yield a more accurate representation of customers’ underlying experiences.  
These findings have implications for review aggregation platforms that seek to accurately reflect 
underlying customer experiences. For instance, YouTube and Netflix switched their rating systems to 
thumbs up/down and like/dislike ratings, respectively, perhaps partially due to the extreme 
distribution of reviews seen in their previous five-point rating systems. Clearly, these binary rating 
systems (thumbs up/down or like/dislike) do not provide a platform for more moderate (i.e., neither 
like nor dislike) opinions, whereas reviewers with extreme opinions can still indicate their love (via 
like or thumbs up) or  hate (via dislike or thumbs down) towards a product or service. Yet a “silent 
majority” of customers with moderate experiences exists, but they are not self-motivated enough to 
engage in unsolicited online WOM. This study shows that in order to collect a more representative set 
of opinions, review aggregation platforms could employ review solicitations instead of abandoning 
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five-point rating systems to reduce the reporting biases of such systems. Platforms should realize that 
the silent majority can be motivated to join online conversations and express their “middle of the 
road” opinions through solicitations, and that exposing all reviewers to the ratings of others can 
further dampen the extremity bias. 
Third, I calculated the impact of online review solicitations on two key online review metrics: 
valence and variance of online ratings. Average online ratings of both solicited and unsolicited 
reviews overstate the average customer experience. Moreover, the variance of online ratings would be 
significantly lower if all customers were solicited to write an online review (as opposed to not 
solicited).  The latter finding has implications for sellers of high-quality products. Previous research 
establishes that a lower variance of ratings increases sales for products with higher average ratings 
(Sun 2011). Therefore, soliciting online reviews could be especially beneficial for companies offering 
high-quality products (presumably with higher average ratings) since the current findings show that 
soliciting reviews decreases the variance of online ratings. Hence, when promoting high-quality 
products, companies should consider online review solicitation strategies to manage the variance of 
their online ratings.  
These results also have implications for customers. Customers should be mindful of the 
possibility that the average online rating inflates the average customer experience. Contrary to 
conventional wisdom, I find that this inflation is not greater for solicited reviews than for unsolicited 
ones. However, customers should be aware that solicited online reviews could present an inaccurate 
picture of product-mismatch risk because the variance of solicited online ratings is significantly 
reduced. Since variance serves as a proxy about the divergence of opinions regarding product quality, 
if variance is low, then customers perceive the mismatch risk to be low. Therefore, even though the 
average rating is not affected by solicited reviews (compared to unsolicited reviews), they do provide 
an inaccurate sense of the extent of opinion divergence about product quality, thus downplaying the 
potential product-mismatch risk. This underrepresentation could be consequential for companies as 
well because if their products do not match customer expectations (based on online reviews) then 
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actions taken by disappointed customers (e.g., returning the product, writing negative reviews) could 
hurt their profitability.   
My final set of findings explains the impact of online review solicitations for the company 
website on review writing behavior on a third-party review platform. Solicitations, on average, 
decrease the number of one-star reviews on a third-party review platform by 48%. I do not find 
statistically significant effects for any other rating. This finding has important implications for 
companies that aspire to reduce the amount of negative online WOM for their products on a third-
party review platform. These companies should seriously consider the trade-off between the cost of 
implementing review solicitations on their own website and the benefit of decreased negative online 
WOM on a third-party review platform, which potentially has a greater reach.  
Even though observing customers’ private ratings through satisfaction surveys is a strength of the 
current setup, it also poses a limitation in terms of the study’s generalizability. All customers in this 
study completed a customer satisfaction survey and self-selected into doing so. Therefore, whether the 
effects identified here would replicate using data from non-survey takers remains a question for future 
research. Although it sounds impractical to measure customers’ private ratings without some form of 
a survey, I hope that future research could overcome this challenge through clever research design.         
The review solicitations in this study did not include any incentives. However, solicitations could 
involve financial (Klein et al. 2018; Stephen et al. 2012) or social (Burtch et al. 2017; Chen et al. 
2010) incentives. I leave it to future research to determine whether different types of solicitations 
would have similar consequences. Future research could also examine whether solicitations could 
reduce many other biases identified in the literature (see Berger 2014).  
A final observation: it is plausible for solicited and unsolicited reviewers to have different 
motivations in mind while posting online reviews. For example, solicited reviewers could be 
motivated to help managers improve service, whereas unsolicited reviewers could be driven by their 
desires to help other customers. In this study, I do not differentiate between different types of 
motivations because these differences would be reflected in review text as opposed to review ratings. 
 37 
 
However, review text differences between solicited and unsolicited reviews could be an interesting 
avenue for future research.  
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
Figure 1. Review solicitation is random  
 
Figure 2. Timeline of Events 
 
Jan 2012     Jan 2013        Jan 2014         Jan 2015     May 2015 
  
 
 
  
   
 
 
22% 24% 22% 22% 23% 24% 24% 24% 27% 25%
78% 76% 78% 78% 77% 76% 76% 76% 73% 75%
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Survey rating
On average, 25% of surveys are randomly selected for online 
review solicitation
Solicited Unsolicited
Review writing 
feature on the hotel 
website is enabled. 
Majority of hotels 
had at least one 
review on the hotel’s 
website by 
December of 2012. 
No review 
solicitation during 
this period.  
Review solicitations start in 
2014.   
Cohort 1 
Satisfaction surveys 
conducted in 2013 
are used to estimate 
the posting potential 
model. 
Cohort 2 
Satisfaction surveys conducted 
between January 2014 and 
May 2015 are used to assess 
the impact of solicitation and 
conformity.  
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Figure 3. Different types of reviewers  
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➢ Does not write an online review 
N=48,826 
 
Solicited Survey Taker 
(SST) 
 
➢ Randomly solicited to 
write an online review 
upon survey completion 
N=96,646 
Unsolicited Survey Taker 
(UST) 
 
➢ Randomly NOT 
solicited to write an 
online review 
N=293,143 
Solicited Reviewer (SR) 
➢ Writes an online review through the 
solicitation procedure  
➢ Not exposed to preexisting online 
reviews through review submission 
process (no conformity) 
N=47,820 
Cohort 2 
➢ All survey takers 
between January of 
2014 and May of 
2015 
➢ Private survey 
ratings are revealed 
only to the company 
and the researcher 
 
N=389,789 
 
Unsolicited Reviewer (UR) 
➢ Writes an online review by 
navigating to the hotel website on 
his/her own account 
➢ Exposed to preexisting online 
reviews (conformity) 
N=1,321 
 
Online ratings 
are made public 
Unsolicited non-Reviewer (UNR) 
➢ Does not write an online review  
N=291,822 
 
Online ratings 
are made public 
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Figure 4. Survey ratings across different types of reviewers  
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Figure 5. Relationship between survey rating and probability of writing an online review 
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Figure 6. Rating adjustments 
  
Notes. URs are more likely to post an online rating that differs from their survey rating. On the other hand, SRs submit online ratings that are very 
similar to their survey ratings. For instance, conditional on a survey rating of 6, SRs submit an online rating of 3 (maintain) 91% of the time, whereas 
the same probability is 56% for URs. There is a 23% chance that URs will post an online rating of 4 (upgrade), whereas the same is observed only 4% 
of the time for SRs. 
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Figure 7. URs who filled out their survey and online review on the same day 
 
 
 
Notes. Timing only slightly explains rating adjustments observed in Figure 6.   
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Figure 8. Impact of private (survey) ratings on probability of writing an online review 
  
Notes. An estimated reporting bias of 1.3 indicates that the group’s proportion in online public ratings will be 30% more than their  original proportion in the customer base. 
Similarly, an estimated reporting bias of 0.5 indicates that the group’s proportion in online public ratings will be half of their original proportion in the customer base. 
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Figure 9. Solicitation effect on probability of writing an online review 
 
Notes. Solicitation effect increases online WOM participation of those customers with moderate 
experiences more than those with extreme experiences, attenuating the extremity bias. I refer readers 
who are interested in finding out which 𝐿𝑖𝑓𝑡𝑠’s are statistically significantly different from each other 
to Table F1 in Appendix F. 
 
Figure 10. Marginal effect of solicitation on rating adjustment when deviation from others is zero 
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Figure 11. Marginal effect of solicitation on rating adjustment 
  
 
Figure 12. Evidence for conformity on rating adjustment  
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Figure 13. Illustrating bias in public online ratings for a typical hotel 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes. Panel A is the private rating distribution of the original customer base. Panel B is the simulated private 
rating distribution of solicited (top) and unsolicited (bottom) reviewers. Panel C is the simulated public rating 
distribution of solicited (top) and unsolicited (bottom) reviewers.   
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Figure 14. Control vs. Treated Hotels and Pre vs. Post Periods 
 
Sept 3rd, 2013                        Jan 1st, 2014 Jan 8th, 2014                     May 7th, 2014   May 28th, 2014 
  
 
 
  
   
 
 
Figure 15. Expected and observed probabilities for the number of one-star reviews 
PRE period 
120 days 
POST period 
120 days 
 
Solicitation experimentation on a subset of hotels 
between Jan 1st and Jan 8th: 
Treated hotels: randomly selected 151 hotels to 
test out solicitations 
Control hotels: remaining 2,140 hotels 
 
 
 
 
On May 28th, 2014, 
solicitations are rolled across 
all hotels within the portfolio 
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Figure 16. Treatment effect of review solicitations for company website on posting behavior at a third-party review platform  
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
 SSTs USTs 
Variable # of obs. Average Std. dev. # of obs. Average Std. dev. 
Ln(room rate paid) 96,646 5.17 1.13 293,143 5.16 1.17 
Ln(# of nights) 96,646 1.04 0.45 293,143 1.03 0.45 
Ln(# of guests) 96,646 0.94 0.30 293,143 0.95 0.31 
Ln(# of months since joining the loyalty program) 96,646 1.57 1.39 293,143 1.34 1.35 
Ln(# of unique hotels stayed until the current stay) 96,646 1.04 0.57 293,143 0.97 0.52 
Ln(# of unique chains stayed until the current stay) 96,646 0.86 0.29 293,143 0.82 0.27 
Ln(# of previous stays at the current hotel) 96,646 0.27 0.60 293,143 0.24 0.57 
Ln(days between survey sent and completed) 96,646 1.36 0.83 293,143 1.32 0.85 
Posting potential (all satisfaction levels) 96,646 0.0124 0.0063 293,143 0.0112 0.0059 
Posting potential (satisfaction levels less than 6/10) 7,099 0.0122 0.0063 23,999 0.0112 0.0059 
% of members in Tier 1 96,646 88%  293,143 85%  
% of members in Tier 2 96,646 7%  293,143 8%  
% of members in Tier 3 96,646 5%  293,143 7%  
 51 
 
Table 2. Impact of survey rating and solicitation on probability of writing an online review 
Variables Probit Model 1 Probit Model 2 
I(s=1)   0.66*** 
(0.07) 
 0.66*** 
(0.07) 
I(s=2)  0.56*** 
(0.08) 
 0.56*** 
(0.08) 
I(s=3)  0.40*** 
(0.07) 
 0.40*** 
(0.07) 
I(s=4)  0.32*** 
(0.08) 
 0.32*** 
(0.08) 
I(s=5)  0.21*** 
(0.07) 
 0.21*** 
(0.07) 
I(s=6)   0.13* 
(0.07) 
 0.13* 
(0.07) 
I(s=8)  0.08* 
(0.05) 
 0.08* 
(0.05) 
I(s=9)  0.17*** 
(0.05) 
 0.17*** 
(0.05) 
I(s=10)  0.33*** 
(0.04) 
 0.33*** 
(0.04) 
Solicited  2.50*** 
(0.04) 
 2.50*** 
(0.04) 
I(s=1) * Solicited -0.10 
(0.09) 
-0.10 
(0.09) 
I(s=2) * Solicited -0.17* 
(0.10) 
-0.17* 
(0.10) 
I(s=3) * Solicited -0.11 
(0.08) 
-0.11 
(0.08) 
I(s=4) * Solicited -0.15* 
(0.08) 
-0.14* 
(0.08) 
I(s=5) * Solicited -0.14* 
(0.07) 
-0.14* 
(0.07) 
I(s=6) * Solicited -0.11 
(0.07) 
-0.11 
(0.07) 
I(s=8) * Solicited  0.09* 
(0.05) 
 0.09* 
(0.05) 
I(s=9) * Solicited  0.09* 
(0.05) 
 0.09* 
(0.05) 
I(s=10) * Solicited  0.27*** 
(0.05) 
 0.27*** 
(0.05) 
Posting Potential    9.74*** 
(0.60) 
Constant -2.84*** 
(0.04) 
-2.96*** 
(0.04) 
Number of observations 389,789 389,789 
Log-likelihood -73,878 -73,744 
Notes. I chose survey rating of 7/10 to be the baseline category based on Figure 5, which shows that 
these customers are the least likely to write an unsolicited online review.     
***p<0.01;**p<0.05;*p<0.1 
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Table 3. Impact of conformity and solicitation on rating adjustment 
 Heckman Model 1 Heckman Model 2 
 
Online review writing incidence  
Coefficient estimate 
(Std. Err.) 
Coefficient estimate 
(Std. Err.) 
I(s=2)  0.44*** 
(0.09) 
 0.44*** 
(0.09) 
I(s=4)  0.20** 
(0.08) 
 0.19** 
(0.08) 
I(s=8) -0.05 
(0.06) 
-0.05 
(0.06) 
I(s=10)  0.20*** 
(0.05) 
 0.20*** 
(0.05) 
Solicited  2.39*** 
(0.06) 
 2.39*** 
(0.06) 
I(s=2) * Solicited -0.07 
(0.10) 
-0.06 
(0.10) 
I(s=4) * Solicited -0.04 
(0.09) 
-0.04 
(0.09) 
I(s=8) * Solicited   0.20*** 
(0.06) 
 0.20*** 
(0.06) 
I(s=10) * Solicited  0.38*** 
(0.06) 
 0.38*** 
(0.06) 
Posting Potential    8.79*** 
(0.76) 
Constant -2.72*** 
(0.05) 
-2.82*** 
(0.05) 
 
Rating adjustment (conditional on review writing incidence) 
Solicited  0.02 
(0.13) 
 0.01 
(0.13) 
Deviation from others -0.77*** 
(0.05) 
-0.77*** 
(0.05) 
Deviation from others * Solicited  0.68*** 
(0.05) 
 0.68*** 
(0.05) 
Correlation coefficient (𝜌)  0.03 
(0.05) 
 0.03 
(0.05) 
Number of observations (surveys) 243,142 243,142 
Number of selected observations (online reviews) 32,103 32,103 
Log-likelihood -49,447 -49,380 
Notes. Only surveys reporting an even rating are used for this estimation. Survey rating of 6/10 is the 
baseline category. 
***p<0.01;**p<0.05;*p<0.1 
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Table 4. Robustness checks 
 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 
 
Online review writing incidence  
   
I(s=2)  0.51*** 
(0.14) 
 0.61*** 
(0.14) 
 0.62*** 
(0.18) 
 0.38** 
(0.19) 
I(s=4)  0.12 
(0.14) 
 0.22 
(0.14) 
 0.09 
(0.20) 
 0.29* 
(0.16) 
I(s=8)  0.08 
(0.09) 
 0.12 
(0.10) 
 0.12 
(0.13) 
 0.09 
(0.12) 
I(s=10)  0.34*** 
(0.09) 
 0.36*** 
(0.10) 
 0.36*** 
(0.12) 
 0.29*** 
(0.11) 
Solicited  2.59*** 
(0.09) 
 2.62*** 
(0.10) 
 2.53*** 
(0.13) 
 2.44*** 
(0.11) 
I(s=2) * Solicited -0.15 
(0.16) 
-0.30** 
(0.15) 
-0.30 
(0.20) 
 0.05 
(0.21) 
I(s=4) * Solicited -0.002 
(0.15) 
-0.11 
(0.15) 
 0.05 
(0.21) 
-0.13 
(0.18) 
I(s=8) * Solicited   0.05 
(0.10) 
 0.05 
(0.10) 
 0.05 
(0.13) 
 0.06 
(0.12) 
I(s=10) * Solicited  0.21** 
(0.09) 
 0.21** 
(0.10) 
 0.22** 
(0.11) 
 0.30*** 
(0.11) 
Posting Potential  14.89*** 
(1.49) 
 5.84*** 
(1.08) 
 7.95*** 
(1.45) 
 7.38*** 
(1.29) 
Constant -3.00*** 
(0.09) 
-3.03*** 
(0.09) 
-3.00*** 
(0.12) 
-2.86*** 
(0.11) 
 
Rating adjustment (conditional on review writing incidence) 
Solicited -0.10 
(0.18) 
 0.17 
(0.20) 
 0.20 
(0.26) 
-0.17 
(0.22) 
Deviation from others -0.83*** 
(0.08) 
-0.75*** 
(0.07) 
-0.80*** 
(0.10) 
-0.88*** 
(0.10) 
Deviation from others * 
Solicited 
 0.69*** 
(0.08) 
 0.66*** 
(0.08) 
 0.66*** 
(0.11) 
 0.76*** 
(0.11) 
Correlation coefficient (𝜌) -0.02 
(0.07) 
0.01 
(0.08) 
-0.04 
(0.11) 
-0.03 
(0.09) 
Number of observations 135,889 154,363 77,741 69,976 
Number of selected observations 17,050 18,374 9,615 11,168 
Log-likelihood -25,380 -27,960 -15,104 -16,858 
Observations First-time 
guests only 
Offline 
bookings 
only 
Offline booking 
& at least 10 days 
between booking 
and check-out 
No 
management 
response 
Notes. Only even survey ratings are used for this estimation. Survey rating of 6/10 is the baseline 
category. 
***p<0.01;**p<0.05;*p<0.1
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Table 5. Robustness checks for alternative explanations   
Alternative explanations Robustness check 
Previous stay histories Observations only from 1st ever hotel stay of the individual at the hotel 
group (Model 2.1 in Table 4)  
The role of online 
reviews at the time of 
booking 
1. Observations from offline bookings only (Model 2.2 in Table 4) 
2. Observations from offline bookings where the number of days 
between booking and reviewing is at least 10 days (Model 2.3 in 
Table 4) 
Management response  Observations from survey takers who were very unlikely to observe 
that managers were responding (Model 2.4 in Table 4) 
 
Table 6. Impact of solicitations on third-party review platforms 
 All 
reviews 
one-star 
reviews 
two-star 
reviews 
three-star 
reviews 
four-star 
reviews 
five-star 
reviews 
Treated  0.05 
(0.08) 
 0.29 
(0.19) 
 0.01 
(0.18) 
 0.01 
(0.13) 
 0.03 
(0.10) 
 0.06 
(0.10) 
Post -0.08*** 
(0.03) 
 0.12 
(0.07) 
-0.04 
(0.07) 
-0.10** 
(0.05) 
-0.11*** 
(0.04) 
-0.08 
(0.04) 
Treated*Post -0.05 
(0.10) 
-0.60** 
(0.29) 
-0.05 
(0.26) 
-0.07 
(0.18) 
 0.06 
(0.14) 
-0.08 
(0.14) 
Constant  1.89*** 
(0.02) 
-1.52*** 
(0.05) 
-1.16*** 
(0.05) 
-0.20*** 
(0.03) 
 0.74*** 
(0.03) 
 1.16*** 
(0.03) 
𝛼  0.68*** 
(0.02) 
 1.30*** 
(0.17) 
 1.33*** 
(0.13) 
 1.08*** 
(0.06) 
 0.85*** 
(0.03) 
 1.02*** 
(0.03) 
Number of 
observations 
4,582 4,582 4,582 4,582 4,582 4,582 
Log-likelihood -13,295 -2,720 -3,268 -5,591 -8,706 -10,407 
 
Corrected 
Interaction term 
 
-0.34 
(0.71) 
 
-0.14** 
(0.07) 
 
-0.02 
(0.08) 
 
-0.05 
(0.14) 
 
 0.11 
(0.29) 
 
-0.24 
(0.43) 
Notes. In all models, the LR test of 𝛼 = 0 is rejected, indicating negative binomial model to be more appropriate 
than Poisson model.  
***p<0.01;**p<0.05;*p<0.1 
 
Table 7. Reviewing behavior on TripAdvisor.com 
Number of observations 
one-star two-star three-star four-star five-star 
41,657 reviews 72,081 reviews 222,905 reviews 560,740 reviews 732,863 reviews 
Percentage of reviewers who write only 1 review conditional on review rating 
one-star two-star three-star four-star five-star 
7.7% 4.6% 2.1% 2.1% 3.3% 
Average number of reviews per reviewer conditional on review rating 
one-star two-star three-star four-star five-star 
22 
reviews/reviewer 
30 
reviews/reviewer 
44 
reviews/reviewer 
47 
reviews/reviewer 
32 
reviews/reviewer 
Notes. Of 41,657 one-star reviews observed, 7.7% of them (3,224 reviews) are posted by individuals who posted 
only once. Of 732,863 five-star reviews observed, 3.3% of them (24,210 reviews) are posted by individuals who 
posted only once. The average number of reviews (with any rating) posted by individuals who posted at least a 
one-star review is 22. Statistics are calculated using reviewers who posted a review on the TripAdvisor website 
at least 400 days after and at most 500 days after joining the website to make sure that membership timing 
cannot explain away observed data patterns.   
